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ABSTRACT 
 
EZEKIEL MORENO: Strategic Culture and the Failure of Command: The Peruvian Army 
Struggle Against Sendero Luminoso in the Highlands, 1980-89 
(Under the direction of Miguel A. La Serna) 
 
 
This study assesses Peru’s military history and strategic culture and argues that the armed 
forces’ failure of command and control allowed violence to go unabated during the 
counterinsurgency struggle. From 1930-80 Peru developed a strategic culture that associated 
national defense with internal security, development, and popular support.  The military’s 
discourse and actions during this period were influenced by this vision of defense and it 
continued to shape military operations in the 1980s.  Framed in this larger analysis, the 
accepted explanations for the violence, which often center on racism and the use of a 
scorched-earth strategy, are incomplete. The military’s failure of command allowed units to 
operate autonomously and develop informal procedures predicated on fear, frustration, and 
social biases.  Through military documents, publications, interviews, and speeches this study 
shows that the military’s structural failure, command and control, allowed rampant violence 
to shape counterinsurgency operations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The May 1980 Peruvian presidential elections initiated a peaceful but tense transfer 
from military to civilian rule.  Coinciding with this transition, Sendero Luminoso initiated its 
guerrilla insurgency in the remote highland town of Chuschi, Ayacucho the night before 
elections.  Over the next three years, attacks by Sendero increased and gradually became a 
national security concern as the police force’s counter-insurgency effort first intensified and 
ultimately proved ineffective.  Unable to dominate the terrain due to the lack of 
transportation, personnel, and equipment, local government officials and police forces 
retreated and, in effect, surrendered terrain.  The retreat of the state and Sendero’s promise of 
equality and aggrandizement allowed the guerrilla group to establish support networks based 
on popular appeal and fear.1  In the hopes of regaining control over the countryside, the 
Peruvian state charged the military with carrying out the counterinsurgency in December of 
1982.  When the armed forces entered the fray in January 1983 it may have already missed 
its target of opportunity for a quick end to the insurgency.  The armed forces struggled to 
understand and contain the chaos as it took on a life of its own.    
The period from 1983 to 1985 was perhaps the darkest of the conflict, with civilians 
suffering atrocities committed by both the military and Sendero Luminoso.  The violations of 
human rights, however, continued throughout the decade as the violence engulfed the nation 
in a civil war that claimed the lives of some 69,000 people, many of them indigenous 
                                                             
1 Lewis Taylor, Shining Path Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980-1997 (London: Liverpool 
University Press, 2006), 35. 
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peasants.2  According to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) in 2003, 
the Peruvian state was responsible for nearly half of the deaths and disappearances.   
Scholars, politicians, and journalists have attributed the high number of casualties to a variety 
of factors:  regionalism, racism, and a bloodthirsty counterinsurgency strategy.  These 
explanations only tell part of the story, as they do not pay sufficient attention to the Peruvian 
military or strategic culture.  Strategic culture refers to a set of ideas and beliefs that shape 
how a country perceive issues of national security and is shaped by factors such as culture, 
politics, institutional development, and history.  Over time, countries develop norms and 
perspectives that influence behavior in both the near and long term with regards to national 
defense.   Political scientists first introduced the concept of strategic culture in the 1970s to 
explain why countries fail to make rational choices in foreign policy and defense decisions.  
Military historians have sued the term ‘way of war’ to describe a similar process in the 
conduct of war.   It is only during the past two decades, however, that this scholarship has 
merged and found to be complimentary in that “a country’s way of war may be viewed as 
both a subset and product of its overall strategic culture.”3  
Using Peru’s strategic culture as a point of departure, this study offers an alternative, 
or at least additive, explanation for the violence in the Peruvian highlands from 1980-89.  
Through secondary literature, army publications, internal documents, and interviews 
compiled by the CVR, I argue that the atrocities committed by soldiers do not reflect a 
doctrinal strategy on the part of the Peruvian armed forces.  Rather, the excessive violence 
                                                             
2 Christine Hunefeldt, A Brief History of Peru (New York: Lexington Associates, 2004), 239; Mario Fumerton, 
From Victims to Heroes: Peasants Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000 (London: 
Rozenberg Press, 2003), 110–114. 
 
3  The following work provides an excellent summary of the strategic culture as understood by political 
scientist and historians. Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War (New York: Routledge, 2006), 
1–3. 
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resulted from a breakdown of command and control.  As a result of this structural failure, 
soldiers and commanders on the ground were free to commit acts of indiscriminate violence 
that betrayed their historical approach to internal security.   
This essay is broken into four sections.  The first discusses the historiography on the 
Peruvian counterinsurgency.  While the Peruvian civil war has generated a good deal of 
scholarship, studies of the military counterinsurgency are scarce.  The few studies that have 
been done on the topic suggest that human rights violations were part and parcel of the 
military’s counterinsurgency strategy.  However, this approach does not consider the 
military’s strategic culture in the years leading up to and including the 1980s political 
violence.  It is with this in mind that the second section describes the evolution of a Peruvian 
military strategic culture in the decades leading up to insurgency.  This was a period in which 
the military defined internal unrest as the greatest threat to national security.  The only way 
to combat this threat, commanders argued, was to give the armed forces a more active role in 
national politics.  Generals understood, however, that they would need popular support in 
order to maintain a sense of legitimacy.  This strategic culture culminated in the military 
coup that placed the left-of-center rule of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed 
Forces (GRFA) in power from 1968-1980.  The third section focuses only on the army and 
traces the influence of strategic culture into the 1980s.  The narrow approach is necessary 
because of the complexity of the state apparatus that engaged in counterinsurgency 
operations.  Although the military was no longer leading the nation, the army continued to 
associate national defense with internal security and popular support.  Seen in this light, a 
scorched-earth strategy sharply contradicted the Peruvian military’s strategic culture.  Why, 
then, did combat operations in the emergency zones stray from the military’s inherited legacy 
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of populism and security?  Section four addresses this question, demonstrating that the 
army’s failure of command and inability to influence daily operations were at the heart of its 
strategic breakdown.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
Relatively few studies have focused on the state’s security forces (military, police, 
and intelligence community).  There are two major explanations for this. The first has to do 
with the paucity in documentation, as the conflict is recent history and legal action is still 
pending in some situations.  Moreover, several documents remain classified or restricted and 
have not yet been released to the general public.  The second explanation is a lack of 
scholarly enthusiasm for the Peruvian military.  Scholars have focused on understanding 
Sendero Luminoso, its origins, and other none state actors such as the Rondas Campesinas.4  
Considering the lack of documentation and the nature of the violence, this neglect is to be 
expected.  What has resulted is an incomplete understanding of the conflict and military 
operations.   
The few scholars who have focused on the state response, specifically the military, 
generally concentrate on the 1980s and rely on open sources such as speeches, training 
manuals, and media reports.  The result is a narrative that traces strategy from below and fails 
to consider the military’s institutional development or strategic culture.  An early analysis of 
                                                             
4 The following works show the general trend in literature regarding the insurgency.  The most significant 
works that include the military will be discussed directly.  Cynthia McClintock, “Why Peasants Rebel: The Case 
of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso,” World Politics 37, no. 1 (1984): 48–84; David S. Palmer, “Rebellion in Rural Peru: 
The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso,” Comparative Politics 18, no. 2 (1986): 127–146; Lewis Taylor, 
“Agrarian Unrest and Political Conflict in Puno, 1985-1987,” Bulletin Of Latin American Research 6, no. 2 
(1987): 135–162; Carlos I. Degregori, Ayacucho 1969-1979: El Nacimiento de Sendero Luminoso (Lima: Instituto 
de Estudios Peruanos, 1990); Orin Starn, “Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path 
and the Refusal of History,” Journal of Latin American Studies 27, no. 2 (1995): 399–421; Fumerton, From 
Victims to Heroes; Steve J. Stern, ed., Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1998). 
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the counterinsurgency struggle in Peru by sociologist Lewis Taylor contends that the 
military’s approach in the early 1980s was inadequate in that it failed to address the social, 
political, and security requirements necessary to win the hearts and minds of the Peruvian 
peasantry.  Carlos Tapia ultimately comes to the same conclusion after analyzing military 
changes in doctrine, manuals, and organizational leadership.5  Others have been much more 
critical of the state’s counterinsurgency effort.  Nelson Manrique described it as follows: 
The military implemented a counterinsurgency strategy based on the 
indiscriminate use of terror against the peasantry.  This merciless campaign of 
repression, guided by the North American counterinsurgency doctrine absorbed 
by Peruvian military personnel in the schools of Fort Gulick and Panama, tried to 
isolate Shining Path by demonstrating that the army could exert even greater 
terror than the guerrillas.6  
Manrique’s is the harshest and most direct critique of the counterinsurgency strategy, but he is not 
alone.  In 2006, Taylor described the state and military operations as follows: 
An initial phase of indecisiveness and inaction (1980-1982) was followed by a 
bout of largely indiscriminate repression and bloodletting that alienated a 
considerable swathe of the civilian population (1983-1987).  Confronted with an 
ill-devised and ineffective ‘strategy’, after 1989 the armed forces changed tack by 
reducing (although not eliminating) the level of state terrorism.7 
Debroah Poole drew a similar conclusion, using the August 1985 massacre of 39 adults and 
23 children in the highland village of Accomarca as an example.  Lieutenant (Lt.)Termo 
Hurtado, the commander of the unit responsible for the massacre, declared, “I consider the 
decisions I took to be correct.”  He later stated, “You cannot trust a woman, an old person or 
                                                             
5 Lewis Taylor, “Counter-Insurgency, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980-1996,” 
Bulletin of Latin American Research 17, no. 1 (1998): 35–58; Carlos Tapia, Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero 
Luminoso: Dos Estrategias y Un Final (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1997). 
 
6 Nelson Manrique, “The War for the Central Sierra,” in The Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 
1990-1995, ed. Steve J. Stern (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 193. Interestingly, no substantial study 
has been conducted regarding what percentage of Peruvian officers attended school at Fort Gulick in the 
decades prior to the conflict and their position within the Peruvian army in the 1980s. Nor has any study 
addressed the training material as it relates to the Peruvian context, especially in a post-Vietnam period.    
 
7 Taylor, Shining Path Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980-1997, 38. 
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a child [because Sendero] begins to indoctrinate them when they are just two or three years 
old.  Little by little, through trickery and punishment, they win them over to their cause.”8  
Facing the possibility of civilian legal action, high-ranking officers came to Lt. Hurtado’s 
defense, proclaiming him a national hero and demanded that he be tried in a military tribunal.  
In a military court, Lt. Hurtado was eventually sentenced to 10 days in prison and summarily 
removed from public view.  For Poole and Manrique, Hurtado’s general lack of remorse, 
together with the unabated support provided by senior-leadership, confirmed his actions as 
representative of an institutional strategy at both the soldier and organizational level.   
Poole’s assessment, however, does not give sufficient attention to civil-military 
relations.  As discussed by Gorritti and other scholars, the transfer to a civilian government in 
1980 ensured a degree of military autonomy.9  It is this institutional self-preservation that 
arguably pushed military leaders to support Lt. Hurtado before the state.  Once the army was 
responsible for prosecuting Lt. Hurtado, a man it championed a hero, it could not openly 
persecute him without losing face before the public and throughout the service.  The troops, 
charged with carrying out the counterinsurgency and oblivious to the political maneuvering, 
could perceive such events as condoning the use of violence to achieve a desired effects. 10 
These analyses do not take into account the military’s institutional history prior to the 
insurgency.  Some scholars have already begun unpacking this past with respect to Sendero 
Luminoso.  Both Carlos Ivan Degregori and Jaymie Heilman explore the rise of Sendero 
                                                             
8 As quoted in Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, Peru: Time of Fear (London: Latin American Bureau, 
1992), 8. Deborah Poole suggests that military support was due to politics but does not provide substantial 
information. 
 
9 Gustavo Gorriti, The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru, trans. Robert Kirk (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
 
10 Jo-Marie Burt, Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru: Silencing Civil Society (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 54–55. This section details some of the issues between military autonomy and 
state control. 
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Luminoso in the decades leading up to the conflict.11  Degregori examines Ayacucho in the 
1970s in order to identify the historical conditions that made it an ideal location for Sendero 
to take hold.  Heilman’s comparative study of two villages in Ayacucho examines changes in 
specific political and social issues over an entire century.  The military, however, has not 
received such attention or analysis despite the availability of secondary sources on the 
Peruvian armed forces.12  Jo-Marie Burt provides the best comprehensive approach of the 
state and the counterinsurgency.  However, her focus is the “relationship between expanding 
political violence, a weakening of civil society, and a growing societal acceptance of 
authoritarianism” in Peru from 1980 to 2000.13  The military in the early 1980s is an 
important part of her work, but not the primary focus.  This study is intended to take the first 
step in a new direction and provide a fresh perspective in the study of the military response to 
Sendero Luminoso.  
                                                             
11 Degregori, Ayacucho 1969-1979: El Nacimiento de Sendero Luminoso; Jaymie Heilman, Before the Shining 
Path: Politics in Rural Ayacucho, 1895-1980 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
 
12 The following works are clear example of some country specific studies of Peru and the military. Frederick 
Nunn, Yesterday’s Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890-1940 (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1983); Daniel M. Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sanchez 
Cerro to Sendero Luminoso (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1991); Dirk Kruijt, Revolution By Decree: Peru, 1968-
1975 (Amsterdam: Thela Publishers, 1994); Liisa L. North, Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru, 
Politics of Modernization Series 2 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1966); Liisa L. North and Tanya 
Kokovkin, The Peruvian Revolution and the Officers in Power, 1967-1976 (Montreal: McGill University, 1981); 
Philip Mauceri, State Under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996). 
 
13 Burt, Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru, 16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGIC CULTURE 
 
 
The period from 1930-80 was essential in setting the political and military conditions 
of the Peruvian civil war.  In the absence of a conventional foreign threat, the military 
focused on internal security and increasingly viewed itself as central to overcoming the 
political fragmentation that hindered national development.  The military, however, seldom 
used force to achieve internal security.  Instead, it sought to preempt revolution through 
populist programs and development.  Thus, Peru developed a strategic culture that placed a 
primacy on internal security, development, and militarily lead reform.   Internal security 
sought to curtail civil-unrest and the development of insurgencies. Development, more 
nuanced, sought social, economic, and industrial growth so as to improve the conditions of 
the Peruvian citizenry.  Although not necessarily altruistic, the military undeniably sought to 
encourage popular investment in the state.  
Peruvian history helped define national security in terms associated with social and 
economic development.  This perspective was institutionalized in professional military 
schools such as the Center of Higher Military Studies (CAEM) in the 1950s.  This, however, 
reflected a longer historical trend.  The roots of the Peruvian military’s strategic culture can 
be traced back to the 1930s.  By then, the Peruvian military had undergone nearly three 
decades of institutional growth under foreign military missions and gradually distanced itself 
from politics.  Yet, it simultaneously developed a militaristic approach to national issues.  
The armed forced developed a “propensity and willingness to apply solutions based on a 
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military ethos to social, economic, and political problems.”14  The military spurred this 
militarism by framing the 1933 constitution, which defined its mission as follows: “The 
purpose of the armed forces is to secure the rights of the Republic, the fulfillment of the 
Constitution and the laws, and the preservation of public order."  This mandate allowed the 
armed forces to act independent of both civilian and political control when the military 
deemed it necessary.  Working in tandem, militarism and this institutional independence 
shaped how the military viewed itself and national defense for the next 50 years.  Lieutenant 
colonel (Lt. Col..) Luis Maria Sánchez-Cerro was a harbinger of this professional militarism.  
Confronted with economic decline, unemployment, and social unrest caused by the great 
depression, he led a coup d’etat in 1930 in order to provide direction amidst the bedlam.  The 
preservation of public order was championed again in 1948 by General (Gen.) Manuel Odría 
and in 1962 under a short-lived Military Junta.  In the months preceding the Junta, an army 
general at the Peruvian Superior War College stated that the constitution mandated that the 
military “confront all subversive and extremist forces which openly or covertly threaten the 
nation’s institutions and. . . intervene in all situations which endanger the stability of 
institutions and the ordered free and sovereign life of the republic.”15  The statement clearly 
captures a more robust version of rights of the Republic and the preservation of public order.  
Such a view not only validated military intervention in 1948, but also charted the course for 
the future. 
 The discursive linking of public order and social improvement took root in the 1930s.  
This process was ushered in by the social and ideological threat posed by the Popular 
American Revolutionary Alliance (APRA).  Founded in 1924, APRA directly challenged the 
                                                             
14 Nunn, Yesterday’s soldiers, 2. 
 
15 General Peréz Godoy as quoted in Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latina America, 172. 
11 
 
existence of the republic by fomenting revolution through unions and populist politics.  From 
the military’s perspective, APRA and its revolutionary ideology threatened national security.  
Lieutenant colonel Sánchez-Cerro, again, helped set the stage for the military.  On his way to 
winning the presidency in 1930, Lt. Col. Sánchez-Cerro instituted populist programs such as 
the abolishment of the Conscripción Vial (a form of conscripted Indian labor) and electoral 
restrictions in order to limit the political threat posed by APRA.16  His victory, however, was 
violently contested by APRA and in 1933, a party member assassinated him.  This act caused 
irreparable harm to APRA-military relations despite the fact that both sought to address 
popular concerns through social reform.  Their political and social objectives were congruent 
but they differed in implementation.  The Popular American Revolutionary Alliance sought 
revolution and the military wanted state lead reform.17  It was in response to APRA and 
popular demands that in 1948 Gen. Odría led a coup and ascended to the presidency.  Once 
in power, he moved to undermine APRA’s political base.  General Odría, much like the Junta 
in 1962, implemented pro-labor legislation, housing initiatives, and expanded employment 
through public work programs intended to connect the government with unions and 
individuals.  These measures were intended to both weaken APRA’s political support and 
appease social unrest.18  
Helping to shape the military’s institutional mission and focus was the armed forces 
itself.  In addition to framing its mission in the 1933 constitution, in 1950 the military  
established the CAEM which pushed a vision of “national defense [that] included social and 
                                                             
16 Steve Stein, Populism in Peru: The Emergence of the Masses and the Politics of Social Control (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), 61–62. 
 
17 Nunn, Yesterday’s Soldiers, 174. 
 
18 Liisa L. North, “Ideological Orientation of Peru’s Military Rulers,” in The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 246–247. 
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economic development as a mandatory component of national security.”  Responsible for 
training senior officers for high level command, CAEM’s interpretation of national defense 
influenced military thought in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.19  This school and its mission are 
indicative of the growing trend within the officer corps that, since the 1930s, connected 
national defense with internal security.  In fact, in the 1940s the officers regularly addressed 
the military’s modernizing mission and this gained traction with the establishment of 
CAEM.20 
Development, however, was not limited to infrastructure and legislation.  With 
mandatory military service, training was an avenue to improve the population and strengthen 
the nation.  It provided education and basic vocational skills such as construction and 
maintenance that gave Peruvians an opportunity to improve their social standing.  The soldier 
was “a permanent vehicle for Peru’s modernization,” but officers were cognizant of the risk 
posed by militarily trained civilians. 21  This was specifically true in reference to indigenous 
recruits and in 1960s, the army implemented measures to ensure they were treated well and 
made progress.  As Daniel Masterson observes, this “demonstrated the army’s concern for 
their welfare as well as an anxiety regarding their future revolutionary potential.”22  
The social question was not cast aside, but rather a reality that the military routinely 
attempted to address.  For example, although the military junta in 1962 transferred authority 
back to civilians a year later, it addressed issues such as labor regulation and infrastructure 
                                                             
19 Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latina America, 142. 
 
20 Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latina America, 137–142; Abraham F. Lowenthal, “Peru’s Ambiguous 
Revolution,” in The Peruvian Experiment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 29–31. 
 
21 General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín as quoted in Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latina America, 162–163. 
 
22 Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latina America, 164. 
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development.  Strikes, peasant land seizures, and the emergence of the Revolutionary Left 
Movement (MIR) guerrilla group in 1964 made the need for national reform self-evident.   
The interconnectedness of militarism, the constitutional mandate, and national 
defense developed a shared conviction, a strategic military culture, which led to unified 
military resolve in 1968 despite a divergence in the officers’ political orientation.23  On 
October 3, 1968, General Velasco declared in the closing remarks of the GRFA manifesto: 
The Revolutionary Government, at one with the aspiration of the Peruvian people 
calls on them to struggle, together with the armed forces, to attain authentic social 
justice, dynamic national development and the reestablishment of the moral values 
which alone can guarantee the achievement of the highest destiny for our fatherland.24 
 
Again, the Military associated national security with social justice and national development.  
Under Velasco (1968-75) the military Junta implemented programs intended to expedite 
modernization of the economy and ease social demands.  In addition to the nationalization of 
foreign and national companies, it executed the most drastic land reform programs outside of 
Cuba.25  Land reform directly countered social unrest that allowed insurgencies to develop, 
while newly created sugar cooperatives resolved labor disputes.  Similarly, nationalization 
won popular support from the working class while the National System of Support and Social 
Mobilization (SINAMOS) attempted to connect government with labor organizations 
through state led programs.26   
                                                             
23 North and Kokovkin, The Peruvian Revolution and the Officers in Power, 1967-1976, 44.  This work outlines 
the sharp political division among several prominent military officers during the military regime.  Thus, 
ideological consensus and a military culture of obedience and unity explain why, despite personal political 
divisions, the military moved in unison with Velasco in 1968. 
 
24 As quoted in North and Kokovkin, The Peruvian Revolution and the Officers in Power, 1967-1976, 5–6. 
 
25 Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latina America, 206–208. 
 
26 David P. Werlich, Peru: A Short History (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 300–304, 308–
319. 
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 By the 1970s, the military leaders perceived internal security as the greatest national 
concern.  Force, although effective against the MIR in 1964, was not the solution according 
to some officers.  General Jose Graham Hurtado, who served on Velasco’s Advisory 
Committee, clearly articulated how MIR impacted the military’s vision of national security.  
He said, “It was the guerrillas who rang the bell that awakened the military to the reality of 
the country” and helped the armed forces realize that the problem would not be solved with 
bullets.27   
 By 1975 the corporatist nature of the armed forces, which had unified military 
leadership despite political divisions, began to splinter as government policies proved 
ineffective.  Amidst sharp economic decline and social unrest, in 1978 the military 
government took the first steps towards reestablishing civilian authority.  This required 
forced changes to the military’s strategic culture.  Once the leaders of the nation, by 1980 the 
military was in full retreat and the primary threat redefined.  It ostensibly focused on a 
traditional external state enemy, but internal security and its association with “hearts and 
minds” and development remained a central part of the army’s discourse as it engaged 
Sendero Luminoso. 
                                                             
 
27 As quoted in North and Kokovkin, The Peruvian Revolution and the Officers in Power, 1967-1976, 42–43. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
CONTINUATION OF AN INHERITED LEGACY 
 
 
The transfer to civilian authority in 1980 corresponded with a new constitutional 
mandate for the armed forces. The change was deliberate and intended to curtail the 
military’s willingness to partake in domestic politics.   Its new mission, to “guarantee the 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic,” sought an outwardly 
focused mission.  Despite being forced to abandon its position as the nation’s leader, the 
long-established strategic culture that associated national security with development 
persisted.  As the civil war wreaked havoc on the nation, army discourse continued to view 
popular support and development as key to achieving internal security.  This discursive 
continuity, however, is overshadowed by the army’s use of force in the Peruvian central 
highlands from 1982 to 1985.  
Military journals from the early 1980s, such as Actualidad Militar and Revista Militar 
de Perú, show that the army continued to view internal security as central to its mission.  
Their covers proudly display slogans such as: Have Confidence in the Guardians of 
Independence, Sovereignty, and Integrity of the Nation and From the Coast, to the 
Mountains, to the Jungle: Always Ready to Prevail.28  These are but a couple of titles that 
allude to an inherited institutional legacy.  The first calls on the nation to maintain faith in the 
army and echoes its new mission, while the second title specifically addresses the army’s role 
                                                             
28 Actualidad Militar no. 269 (1981): Cover; Revista Militar Del Perú no. 766 (1981): Cover; Actualidad Militar 
no. 366 (1991): Cover. 
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throughout the country: the coast, the jungle, and the sierra.  It is a clear reference to internal 
security.   
The articles contained within also show that the army’s vision of national defense and 
of itself continued to reflect the embedded strategic culture.  A translated article that 
appeared in the in La Revista Militar de Perú in 1981, directly addressed the threat of 
terrorism within Peru.  Although, the primary focus was to inform the reader of how terrorist 
organizations operate, it discussed internal security in the opening and closing remarks.  In 
addition to asking readers if they believed terrorism to be a real threat to the nation, to the 
article states: 
Our purpose has been to make you aware of the risks that our society is facing 
today…by working with the armed forces and counter terrorist police agencies we 
will develop our own defense by working honestly and morally for the progress of 
our country and we will not surrender to the tactics developed and used by 
terrorists.29 
 
The message was clear: the army would not surrender to terrorism.  For terrorism to succeed, 
the article highlights, it provoked governments to use excessive and uncontrolled violence so 
that the population would condemn the state.  As stated above, the army was intent on not 
falling into the classic guerrilla trap.  Terrorism was a struggle for popular support.   
In 1982, Lt. Col. Teodoro Hidalgo Morey, later promoted to colonel, addressed the 
importance of winning popular support in an article entitled Instruction and Training for the 
National Defense.30  In it, he described what the army was doing within the officer education 
system in order to ensure they were prepared to confront “any external threat or intervene in 
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counterinsurgency operations in any and all capacities.”31  Lieutenant Colonel Morey 
declared that 
The officer is not only responsible for making sure his unit is trained to execute 
combat missions, but also has to maintain a level of moral righteousness and build a 
cohesive group that is enthusiastic about doing their war time mission.  It also has to 
partake in sports, cultural activities, and work to gain community support. These are 
just some of the tasks in which troops partake in daily.32    
 
The two points of interest here are the notion of an elevated moral standard and the inclusion 
of community interaction as an essential aspect of training that unit commanders must work 
towards and foster.  Such skills, in theory, are vital in counterinsurgency operations.  For 
Morey, military training provided both officers and soldiers with an elevated moral 
righteousness that led to a greater sense of patriotism and the ability to overcome the physical 
challenges of combat.  For the officers, this was not enough.  Therefore, their professional 
development program also exposed them to “a broad vision of the social, economic, and 
cultural problems of the country and the world” so that they would be better prepared for 
combat.33  This position reflects the CAEM’s definition of national defense and illustrates 
how it continued to shape the officer education system.  Three months after the article’s 
publication the army was committed to the conflict in Ayacucho. 
Even as the army engaged Sendero, a populist approach was evident.  For example, in 
October of 1984, a period marked by abuses, an army intelligence group in Ayacucho 
distributed a document titled The Key for Success in the Counterinsurgency War, which 
focused on winning popular support.34  It is important to note that this intelligence document, 
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along with several others, was intended for internal consumption.  Marked secret, classified, 
or restricted, it is not rhetoric intended to appease the public, but rather a systematic 
counterinsurgency strategy that never fully materialized.  Not only did The Keys for Success 
in the Counterinsurgency War describe victory as being beyond the grasp of military force, 
but asserted that the “primary objective for the security forces should be to win the 
confidence of the people.”35  In order to gain support, it stated that the soldiers had to be 
prepared to fulfill civilian roles.  In the neglected regions of the emergency-zone, it 
continued, “a mimeograph is much more useful than a machine gun,” and a “pediatrician is 
more important than a mortar-man.”36  The fact that such a document was produced and 
intended for distribution indicates that this course of action was discussed and deemed 
relevant.  This may not speak directly to a hearts and mind approach, but clearly notes that 
conventional operations would not resolve the conflict.    This analysis mirrored what Lt. 
Col. Morey had argued in 1982.  Lieutenant Colonel Morey concluded his article by 
suggesting that the army, despite having focused on conventional military operations, “is also 
READY to assist in the anti-terrorist struggle, when the president of the Republic decides 
it.”37 Popular support was central to success in the article. 
General Adrian Huamán is perhaps the best known advocate for a development 
approach.  A speaker of Quechua who hailed from the province of Apurimac, Gen. Huamán 
embraced a developmental approach and the need to remedy social and economic problems.  
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Now a frail and unimposing man, in 1984 he was the senior officer in the emergency-zone 
and claimed: 
The solution is not military, because if it were military I would resolve it in a question 
of minutes.  If it were just questions of killing, Ayacucho would cease to exist in half 
an hour, so would Huancavelica…But this is not the solution.  The problem is that we 
are talking about human beings, of forgotten communities that have protested for 160 
years and no one has paid attention to their demands, and we are now facing the 
consequences of that situation.38 
 
  While in command, General Huamán gained popular support by capitalizing on his 
knowledge of local customs.  Not only did his command of Quechua prove priceless but he 
also addressed basic needs such as hunger.  General Huamán contended that in 1984 army 
helicopters were associated with the arrival of bread and food.  During his abbreviated 
command, he made it a point to distribute ‘pan’ (bread) because of its local importance.  
Everywhere he went, Gen. Huamán claimed, women and children flocked for pan and 
provided valuable information.39  General Huamán’s view surely disseminated through the 
ranks, much like that of Gen. Clemente Noel.  General Noel was the first to command in the 
emergency zone in 1983 and described as adhering to a counterinsurgency approach similar 
to the 1970s military regimes in the Southern Cone.   The result “was a massive violation of 
human rights that included torture, extrajudicial executions, and forced disappearances.”40 To 
a degree, Gen. Noel is credited for setting the tone of the conflict.  Yet, Gen Huamán’s 
position is dismissed as rhetoric and given little attention by scholars since he was dismissed 
by the president for criticizing the government’s failure to focus on development.  
Interestingly, the removal of both generals by the president was supported by senior military 
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leaders for very opposite reasons.   For senior leaders, the violence under Gen. Noel was 
unacceptable. Yet, Gen. Huamán’s advocacy for the expansion of the military’s functions in 
the emergency zone reminded them of the Velasco era, a role military leaders no longer 
wished to assume.41  
Huamán’s position was not unique.  Morey arguably shared the same perspective and 
continued to serve during the 1980s.  As the editor of Actualidad Militar during the early 
years of the conflict, Morey traveled throughout the emergency-zones and later worked with 
both the Ministry of Defense and War.  His last operational assignment came in 1987, when 
he served as the second in command of the 31st Infantry Division in Alto Huallaga and retired 
in 1988.  Morey’s advancement in rank illustrates that his view on winning popular support 
remained present and influential, strategically and operationally, during the conflict.42      
Morey and Huamán clearly illustrate the influence of strategic culture on an officer’s 
approach to counterinsurgency training and operations.  Their continued service show that 
this inherited institutional strategy towards internal security continued to influence discourse 
before and during the conflict.  This population-centric approach is even more 
understandable given the political context in which the conflict developed.  It took place 
amidst a democracy, with a relatively free press, and among international agencies able to 
assert pressure on the conduct of the war.  For the army to embark upon a deliberate alternate 
path would have meant greater consequences for it as an institution. 
Furthermore, by 1983 it had become evident to many in the military that Sendero did 
not enjoy popular support.  Although army documents available from 1980-84 are scant, the 
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army’s senior leadership was aware of this fact.  Media and government sources can help 
frame the army’s situational awareness.  For example, in February of 1983, just two months 
after the army was committed to the struggle, a U.S. Embassy message stated:  
Sendero is also suffering from the consequences of its errors.  Zealous dedication to 
armed struggle replaced a more cautions, long-term strategy of making friends and 
building alliances among the traditionally oppressed villages.  In a few months 
Sendero used up much of the political capital in the countryside that it spent years 
accumulating.43 
 
The assessment is based on reports provided by the Peruvian government and the local 
media.  Another assessment stated that the military presence meant that the “coerced 
cooperation imposed on much of the rural population [was] breaking down in communities 
where government authority [had] returned.”44  Although Gorriti has shown that Peruvian 
state agencies often failed to work together, it is unlikely that the information that lead to the 
embassy’s assessment went unnoticed by army leadership or operational planners. 
This division between Sendero and the local populace was also evident in other 
forms.  Just one month after the military took control of the counterinsurgency, villages 
clearly demonstrated their resistance to Sendero.  On January 21, 1983, the villagers of 
Huaychao in Huanta province killed seven Senderistas.  Unfortunately, this was followed 
five days later by the accidental killing of eight reporters who were attempting to confirm the 
story.45  This event received significant media coverage throughout the country and was 
addressed in a U.S. embassy report.46  In addition, there were several highland community 
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petitions to the president in the early 1980s requesting military and police support.  Of the six 
letters available, one was sent directly to the Ministry of War, while others had stamped seals 
from various offices to include the Ministry of Defense, War, and the President.47  This 
clearly suggests a regular flow of information.  Detailing the abuses and atrocities committed 
by Sendero in their letters, these communities openly sought assistance and accumulated 
several dozen signatures and fingerprint in a show of unity.  In the district of San Juan de 
Seres, Ayacucho, the community went a step further and constructed barracks intended to 
house 80 soldiers.48  Such a project surely exhausted local resources and attests to their 
precarious situation.  The continual presence of local self-defense groups is just another 
example of localized resistance against Sendero that was present in the early 1980s. 
For the latter half of the decade, scholars generally acknowledge that the military 
embraced a hearts and minds approach.  This is evident in several army journals that display 
patriotic images of soldiers and civilians rendering honor to the Peruvian flag.  This is 
especially true of the series Commando en Acción, which consistently showed high-ranking 
officers visiting civil-military projects throughout the country.49  In addition, articles such as 
The Armed Forces and Civil Defense: Working Together for Security are clearly intended to 
illustrate both national development in the hinterlands as well as progress brought about by 
military action.50  This shift, according to scholars, developed as a learned response.  By the 
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mid-1980s, the use of brute force had proven ineffective and, as Orin Starn explains, there 
was a “recognized need to combine intimidation and persuasion in a so-called ‘integral’ 
strategy, including ‘sociopolitical’ and ‘civic action’ to build support among the 
peasantry.”51  The long-developed Peruvian strategic culture emphasized development and 
popular engagement as key to internal security.  The notion that this ‘sociopolitical’ and 
‘civic action” approach evolved as learned response after 1985, as suggested by scholars, is 
incomplete 
Scholars have not identified the institutional connection between development and 
internal security because of the limited scope of studies and the army’s 1980s image 
management.  First, the army dismissed Sendero Luminoso as a secondary concern and gave 
the impression that engaging Sendero would be like playing with amateurs.52  Second, before 
being assigned to the conflict in 1983, the army had been retreating from its political role and 
focusing on its new constitutional mandate.  It concentrated on external defense, specifically 
along the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border. 53  Moreover, military journals and the equipment 
build-up in the early 1980s demonstrated a focus on conventional military operations.54   In 
fact, even Morey’s article, discussed above, is framed by images of conventional operations.  
Soldiers are shown training on jump towers, anti-tank tactics, and on both radio and 
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generator operations, but as discussed here, the content is very different.  This focus on 
conventional operations remained the primary theme until the late 1980s.   
In addition, when the military was committed to the conflict the violence increased.  
In Ayacucho alone, between 1982 and 1984 the number of deaths attributed to the conflict 
rose from approximately 200 to 2,500.  It is because of the army’s apparent focus on 
conventional operations and the increased death rate that scholars have generally conclude 
that the army pursued a failed doctrinal approach, the so-called scorched-earth strategy.  
Presented in larger historical context, however, this assertion is in need of revision.  In the 
decades leading up the insurgency, the military had developed a strategic culture focused on 
internal security and consistently linked security to national development and popular 
support.  Development would redistribute wealth and remedy the social unrest, the root of 
latent revolutionary fervor.  For the military, addressing social discontent was essential to 
accomplishing the mission.  Confronted with a political defeat in the late 1970s and a 
conventional threat, this historical perspective was quickly overshadowed.  Army 
publications of the early 80s clearly show a focus on conventional war, a transition that 
conflicted with its inherited strategic culture.  Journal articles, officers’ comments and 
military documents show that winning popular support remained central, but the 
discontinuity between desired ends and operational focus caused doctrinal and operational 
uncertainty.    
The military’s use of excessive force during the counterinsurgency struggle against 
Sendero Luminoso is evident.  Granted immunity, soldiers, police officers, and civilians 
provided detailed accounts to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the 
atrocities and violations of civil liberties that they were familiar with, witnessed, or 
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committed.  Such testimonies give accounts of detention without cause, kidnapping, and 
murder.  This, however, does not necessarily constitute a doctrinal strategy.  Approaching the 
same issue from the military perspective and its inherited legacy can provide a better 
understanding of events.  The issue from within the army was its inability to maintain 
effective command and control at the operational level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
DISCIPLINARY CONTROL AND THE PERPUTATION OF VIOLENCE 
 
 
Dispersed across the arid, jagged, and poorly developed landscape of the Peruvian 
highlands, the army established several counterinsurgency bases, often in or near small towns 
or in isolated positions.  The military used company size units of 150-200 soldiers to achieve 
this goal.   To cover the greatest area, companies were subdivided into four platoon size 
elements, 40-60 soldiers, which were assigned specific areas of responsibility.  Junior 
officers, a first or second lieutenant, were in charge of each base with a captain responsible 
for overall operations.  These nodes were further subdivided into three patrol sections of 15-
20 soldiers.  At any one time, each base had one section on patrol, one preparing to go out, 
and another recovering from their 15-20 day security excursion.55  The military’s intent was 
to maintain an immediate presence and deter insurgent activity.  The result, however, was 
much different.  The bases were poorly manned and ill-equipped, and troops often moved to 
and from them at great risk to their personal safety.  These strongholds were not always 
mutually supporting, and they were hindered by a lack of transportation because road 
networks only connected major towns.  The communities most in need of military support 
were often only accessible by helicopter or on foot, with the assistance of local guides and 
pack animals.  The high altitude, thin air, and steep terrain all worked against tight 
operational control.  Maintaining command and control over daily operations and soldiers in 
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such an environment was a daunting task.  The term command and control refers to the 
leadership’s ability, at multiple levels, to extend influence over operations.  This is 
contingent on effective communication and transportation, especially in decentralized 
operations such as the ones executed in the Peruvian highlands during the 1980s.  These 
structural problems allowed tactical events to develop autonomously and fostered an 
environment where soldiers and leaders allowed varying degrees of violence to go 
unchecked.  
 In the closing comments of his 1991 study of the Peruvian military, Daniel Masterson 
describes the problem as follows: 
Soldiers and marines confronted by an elusive and highly dangerous enemy are 
clearly acting out of frustration in a war which has no rules.  But the issue of whether 
human rights abuses are a result of the armed forces’ leadership’s decision to 
‘Argentine’ the war or rather are the results of a poorly disciplined regional 
commanders acting on their own is not clear.56 
 
Command and control was a central issue and of special interest to the army was the focus of 
a speech presented at the military academy in Chorrillos, Lima in the summer of 1989.  
General Jose C. Sammé, who served as the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division in 
Ayacucho in 1985, delivered this key note address.57  General Sammé’s speech was based on 
112 investigations initiated during his service in the emergency-zone in 1985, which were 
broken down the type of violation (i.e. theft, abuse of authority, fraternization, or neglect).  
Gen. Sammé arrived at the following conclusion:    
The personnel in the support units were not mentally or morally prepared to operate 
in isolated conditions of the antiterrorist bases, where it often is impossible to arrive 
on a regular basis in order to ensure control is effective.58 
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Interestingly, his analysis made a sharp distinction between combat and support troops.  
Nonetheless, for Gen. Sammé, a major problem for the army was the lack of moral resolve 
and effective control.  Based on his experience from in 1985, Gen. Sammé contended that the 
absence of leadership was detrimental to good order and discipline.  Among soldiers, there 
were sixteen cases regarding the abuse of authority, eight related to non-disbursement of pay, 
and fifteen regarding negligence of one’s duty.  Speaking in 1989, Gen. Sammé clearly saw 
the army struggling with the same exact issues and to extend his assertion to 1983 and 1984 
would not be a stretch. 
  A Senderista ambush of an army patrol in 1990 is an excellent example of the issues 
faced by the army.  On 11 July, an army column patrolled the region of San Alejandro 
despite having been directed to assume a defensive posture within the base.59  In the initial 
report regarding the ambush, investigators stressed that the patrol not only violated direct 
orders, but that the soldiers failed to follow security measures.  To make matters worse, the 
soldiers lacked radio communication, were wearing civilian clothes, and were operating 
outside their area of responsibility.  Such blatant disregard for procedure and orders surely 
represents a more systematic problem with operational command and control. 
 Although Gen. Sammé focused on disciplinary issues of a military nature, he 
acknowledged that these actions negatively impacted counterinsurgency operations.  
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Discipline lay at the heart of the problem.  A marine serving in Ayacucho in 1984 described 
this systematic breakdown to the Truth Commission:  
 When we first arrived there was a degree of confusion.  The Marine’s operational 
plan stated that we were going to fight terrorism, through a presence-only approach, 
patrols were to be conducted only in a defensive posture, but little by little it started to 
transform into, as you would say, justice by our own hands and the abuses started.60 
 
Informal rules and procedures of violence became accepted practice and were exacerbated by 
peers and leaders who justified their actions as a reality of war.   
 For example, when patrols came under attack in or near a village, they established 
their own informal rules.  Reasoning that the village supported Sendero because the guerrillas 
were nearby, a soldier stated that “there was a rule within the patrol, where there was an 
engagement, that town would be destroyed.”61  Such perverse logic led to the acceptance of 
informal procedures and rules of behavior.  The translated word for destroyed was arrasaba, 
which literally means to ‘destroy’ but can also be described as ‘sweeping through’ and 
possibly ‘pillage’.  The latter does not require a significant logical jump, as other soldiers 
testified that patrols often returned with goods such as radios.62  This situation was worsened 
by the lack of pay and supplies and was identified by Gen. Sammé as a problem.   
 In addition to robbery, gang rapes called “pichanear” also occurred.  Such actions are 
significant because they are of a nonmilitary nature and took place away from command 
supervision.  Recognizing this behavior was not condoned by the chain of command, a 
soldier stated, “we did this while on patrol, it was not done at the command post.”63  Patrols 
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are not led by the rank and file.  Junior officers and senior enlisted men led these operations 
and were possibly involved, indifferent, or ignorant of such events.    
 Not all informal operating procedures, however, occurred away from the patrol bases 
or were hidden from leadership.  Some units practiced a morbid ceremonial baptism when 
welcoming new soldiers.  A soldier identified as Brujo, the Witch-Doctor, because he served 
as a medic, provided the details of one such event.  Shortly after arriving to his unit, a 
formation was held and a bound terrorist suspect was brought before Brujo, who was 
instructed to kill him.  This would mark his initiation into to the unit.  When Brujo hesitated, 
the commanding officer, most likely a captain, swiftly moved to the front and set the 
standard by stabbing the bound man.  This was reality in the emergency-zone according to 
Brujo. “At the moment, to be frank,” he said, “I felt nothing, it was part of war and a normal 
event, I accepted the baptism and did I what was expected.”64  Such events occurred in other 
locations, although they are impossible to quantify.  The mercy killings of fatally wounded 
enemy combatants is another example of the accepted violence, even if humanely justified.65  
Such acts desensitized soldiers to the violence that was part of their reality and not associated 
with military operations. 
 Another marine described the use of violence as being a measure of self-worth and 
praise.   
When conducting interrogations in Huanta… One could not take it very easy on the 
suspect, because you would be considered worthless.  For example, if someone 
knocked out a tooth, you had to knock out two, if you didn’t then you were 
worthless.66 
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From the patrol to the base, leadership at multiple levels failed to enforce standards and 
discipline.  This was a problem that leadership at the strategic level proved powerless to 
rectify.  This inefficacy resulted in a simultaneous degradation of command, which allowed 
for rapes and theft at the unit level and also encouraged individuals to seek justice on their 
own terms. 
 The deterioration of command and control was also evident in the actions taken by 
leadership at the tactical level.  For example, soldiers claimed that holding cells used to 
torture suspects were cleaned prior to the arrival of superior officers and civilian dignitaries.  
In some cases, the cells were dismantled completely and replaced by gardens and 
courtyards.67  Such actions can have two very different interpretations.  First, it can suggest a 
conspiracy between senior leadership and soldiers on the ground to conceal illegal activities.  
This interpretation overlooks the army’s institutional development, even if not shared by all 
officers.  Second, the dismantling of cells suggests autonomy and self-preservation by ground 
commanders. This hypothesis fits within the larger argument regarding the failure of 
command and control.  Visits by leadership, especially those with civilian dignitaries, were 
surly announced and coordinated in advance. The concealment of irregularities by base 
commander to was in their own best professional interest.  These small unit commanders 
were likely to have less than eight years in the army and were products of a strategic culture 
that was embattled by transformation and war. 
 Self-preservation and the need to show results was a real concern.  In June 1989, the 
damage assessment after an engagement between a patrol and Senderistas was nineteen 
suspected terrorists detained and one enemy killed.  In order to defend his combat losses, 
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described as a few soldiers, the base commander instructed his troops to kill the detainees 
and plant weapons on their bodies.  Shortly after a general visited the base, the patrol 
returned to the village and scorched everything.  When asked if the general gave the order, 
the soldier giving the account responded, “He doesn’t tell the commander in front of the 
whole world…the general simply takes him to a side and tells him.”68  The details of the 
conversation will never be known. Nevertheless, this soldier’s perception suggests the 
blurring of authority and legitimacy.   
 The disregard for senior leadership was also vocal and direct.  As stated by Gen. 
Sammé, some troops were not morally prepared to operate in isolation.  A marine’s account, 
given to the CVR in 2003, of Cpt. Camión’s service in the emergency zone is an excellent 
example.69  As a base commander in charge of approximately one hundred marines in 1984, 
Cpt. Camión undeniably shaped the operations around him.  Already angry - or at least 
displeased - by his assignment to a region deemed chaotic, poorly equipped, and with limited 
opportunities for advancement, not much was needed to tilt his moral compass.  When Cpt. 
Camión arrived to take command, the outgoing officer explained daily operations and 
security concerns both on and off the base.  It was during this period that bad habits could be 
transmitted and or predilections reinforced.  Having witnessed the execution of two suspects 
by the outgoing commander, there was little question for Cpt. Camión of how things were 
done.  The day after assuming responsibility, a patrol returning with detainees asked for 
instruction, Cpt. Camion is said to have replied, “You still have to ask me for orders!  You 
know exactly what you have to do and you still have to ask me for orders.  Why have you 
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come here then?  Do you understand?”70  It is no wonder that in 1989, Gen. Sammé would 
stress the importance of implementing effective transfer of authority procedures.  Although 
one cannot assume that the Gen. Sammé was aware of such incidences, he clearly recognized 
its potential for perpetuating disciplinary and security problems. 
  After several successful attempts at avoiding service in the emergency-zone, Cpt. 
Camión finally took command of the region, much to his displeasure.  A witness claimed that 
when holding suspects, Cpt. Camión would strike them and say, “it is your fault that I am 
here, I have a son, a father, and because of you I have to be over here.”71  Captain. Camión’s 
resentment was evident to everyone below him and it set the behavioral standard.  Later, after 
having come under suspicion for the use of excessive force and the possible disappearance of 
a civilian, Cpt. Camión railed against the leadership and was heard saying, “I have come here 
to fight, you don’t fight from an office.”  Captain Camión’s mission was clear: “I was sent to 
fight and ordered to eliminate terrorists so I have to eliminate terrorists.”  If his superiors 
wanted to criticize, according to Cpt. Camion, “they should come here, come here, and suffer 
just like we do.” 72   He challenged the authority of senior leadership in front of his soldiers 
and showed what actions were acceptable under his command.  This is the understanding of 
the conflict that his troops embodied as they engaged in a counterinsurgency struggle where 
the enemy could not be differentiated from civilians.  This ultimately helped set the 
conditions for the use of excess force and abuses. 
 The absence of control in an organization such as the military is suspect because 
discipline is a defining characteristic of the armed forces.  Yet, the examples cited above 
                                                             
 
70 “Testimonio: 100223.” 
71 “Testimonio: 100223.” 
 
72 “Testimonio: 100223.” 
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clearly show a fundamental breakdown at the individual, patrol, and even forward base level.  
One of the major factors that helped shape this was a lack of transportation.  For example, in 
the early 1980s there were only two helicopters available to support the counterinsurgency 
effort and the lack of mobility continued to be an issue throughout the decade.73  Peru’s 
economic collapse after 1985 further exacerbated the military’s ability to acquire fuel, parts, 
and equipment as the conflict spread beyond Ayacucho. This forced soldiers to take undo 
risks in order to accomplish basic operational requirements not associated with combat.  In 
1988, after being denied aerial and additional vehicle support, a convoy consisting of just one 
truck conducted a logistics run to three bases in the vicinity of Tingo Maria.  With food 
rations having been expended two days earlier, the movement was undoubtedly one of 
necessity, but it led to the deaths of thirteen soldiers in an ambush.74   
 Organized and structured towards a conventional fight, the army was not prepared for 
counter-insurgency operations in 1983.  The failure of command and control resulted in the 
systematic break down of discipline and the acceptance of violence at multiple levels.  While 
other factors, such as racism, regionalism, and inadequate training, were also important, they 
can only be understood within the context of the military’s strategic culture.  The failure of 
command and control takes into consideration the Army’s inherited legacy, operational 
conditions, and individual agency, which helped perpetuate the violence at different points 
during the conflict. 
                                                             
73 Mauceri, State under siege, 139. 
 
74 “Da Cuenta de Emboscada sufrida por Vehículo Militar el 03 Julio 88 en la zona del Puene ‘Ronda,” July 5, 
1988, Comisión Permanente del Historia Militar del Perú. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Starting in the 1930s, the military gradually developed a strategic culture that 
centered on three key traits.  First, aided by militarism and a constitutional mandate, the 
armed forces increasingly viewed itself as a national leader.  Second, in the absence of a 
conventional threat, the military increasingly associated national defense with internal 
security.  This position was given greater credence by national politics and the cold war.  
Third, the military understood socio-economic and national development as an integral 
aspect of internal security.  Development would provide the wealth required to appease social 
demands and ultimately obtain popular support or at least investment in the state.  These 
factors guided military action over several decades and culminated in the GRFA, but this 
strategic culture would not continue unchallenged.   
The transfer to civilian authority in 1980 forced the military to redefine its national 
mission.  It was no longer the leader and retreated.  However, the legacy of this deeply 
engrained strategic culture continued to guide army operations as it engaged Sendero 
Luminoso in the Peruvian highlands.  The focus on internal security, development, and 
popular support is evident in the army public and restricted discourse.  Yet, when the army 
entered the fray, there is no doubt that the level violence increased and did not subside until 
the latter half of the 1980s.  This, scholars contend, reflected a shift from a scorched-earth to 
a hearts and minds campaign.  The assertion that the violence that characterized the civil war 
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in the Peruvian highlands derived from a doctrinal approach favoring scorched-earth neglects 
the army’s strategic culture.  
My argument is not that violence and excessive force was absent, but that it was not 
due to an articulated strategy.  The violence seen during the early phase of the conflict can 
better described as a deviation from the army’s strategic culture and resulted from the failure 
of command and control.  Command and control, although ostensibly simple, goes a long 
way in explaining the violence.  The army’s inability to control operations at the tactical level 
allowed individuals, patrols, and units to operate with varying degrees of impunity and 
autonomy.  This explanation accounts for individual agency and complicates the 
conventional narrative of the counterinsurgency.  More important, it opens up possibilities 
for further research.  For example, what role did troop demographics and forced conscription 
play during the counterinsurgency?  If we find, for example, that the troops serving in the 
army were from same communities that the security forces terrorized, we might question 
conventional explanations that emphasize the role of racism in the counterinsurgency.  Along 
the same lines, scholars would do well to compare and contrast the conduct of combatants 
across military and police branches.  How, for example, did the actions of army soldiers 
compare to those of the navy, police, and Civil Guard?  More importantly, which of these 
institutions was responsible for the most violence?  To date, scholars, activists, journalists, 
and government officials continue to treat the Peruvian security forces as a monolithic 
institution that was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Peruvian citizens.  And 
while this is true on a generic level, Peruvian civil society cannot begin to reconcile until it 
identifies which branch was the most problematic and why.  
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Ultimately, further study of the Peruvian security forces along any of these lines 
would help create a more nuanced image of the counterinsurgency.  More important, such 
attention to the intricacies of the counterinsurgency can pressure the security forces to 
acknowledge their failures rather than seeing themselves as the subjects of national 
persecution.75  This is a critical step not just for understanding the complexities of the 
Peruvian counterinsurgency, but for ensuring that Peru’s violent history never repeats itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
75 Asociación Defensores de la Democracia Contra el Terrorismo, “Los Promotores de la CVR en el Perú 
¿Traficantes de lo DDHH?,” August 2006, Comisión Permanente del Historia Militar del Perú; Injusticias Contra 
Los Que Combatieron y Derrotaron a los Terroristas (1980-2000) (Lima, 2007); En Honor A la Verdad (Lima: 
Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejecito del Perú, 2010). The first document provides a brief biography of 
each member of the Truth Commission and ultimately concludes that their politics have shaped the result of 
the study.  It goes on to provide factual errors regarding 16 people listed as disappeared or murdered in the 
report but have since been found alive. The book is a recent publication that provides the army’s official 
account of the conflict serve to illustrate the armed forces resistance to the current. 
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